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Abstract 
The belief in occult forces is still deeply rooted in many African societies, regardless of 
education, religion, and social class of the people concerned. According to many 
Africans its incidence is even increasing due to social stress and strain caused (among 
others) by the process of modernization. Most often magic and witchcraft accusations 
work to the disadvantage of the poor and deprived, but under particular circumstances 
they become a means of the poor in the struggle against oppression by establishing 
"cults of counter-violence". Magic and witchcraft beliefs have increasingly been 
instrumentalized for political purposes. Apparently they lend itself to support any kind 
of political system, whether despotic or democratic. The belief in occult forces has 
serious implications for development co-operation, too. Firstly, because projects, 
constituting arenas of strategic groups in their struggle for power and control over 
project resources, are likely to add further social stress to an already endangered 
precarious balance of power, which makes witchcraft accusations flourish. And 
secondly, because witchcraft accusations may serve as indicators of hidden social 
conflicts, difficult to detect by other methods. 
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The belief that persons are able to master occult forces is a socio-cultural phenomenon of great 
importance in Africa south of the Sahara. Particularly in Western Africa, magic and witchcraft 
have been deeply-rooted for generations, regardless of social strata and urban or rural settings. 
Magic may be applied for good or bad ends. However, belief in "black" magic, or witchcraft, 
used to harm other people for selfish purposes, is the most problematic aspect of this belief. 
Most Africans, that is, peasants, business people or politicians alike, even internationally 
renowned scientists and leaders of Christian churches, are convinced that witchcraft constitutes 
a real threat to society in Africa (cf. Geschiere 1995; Raynal, 1994:124-25; Awolalu 1979:81-
84; cf. Marwick 1975; Multhaupt 1990). 
 Based on a review of the literature and on the author's comparative studies in three African 
societies, this article will answer the following questions: First, what are the general 
characteristics of occult beliefs in Africa? Second, what are the underlying reasons behind 
witchcraft accusations, and who are the major targets of such accusations? Third, how widely 
are occult beliefs instrumentalized for political purposes, and how does this affect the process of 
democratization? Fourth, do witchcraft accusations have any significance for poverty-alleviating 
development planning? (1). 
 
1. INCIDENCE AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MAGIC AND 
WITCHCRAFT BELIEFS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
 In spite of widespread assumptions (cf. e.g. Brain 1982:382), the incidence of magic and 
witchcraft does not necessarily decrease in the course of modernization. According to many 
Africans, it has rather increased, both in terms of frequency and in terms of effectiveness over 
recent decades (cf. Drucker-Brown 1993:539; Kohnert, 1983). Generally speaking this may be 
due to a psycho-social reaction to the African Crisis, as de Jong explains in the case of the 
njang-njang movement in Guinea-Bissau (cf. Jong 1987a). In particular belief in witchcraft 
may be a reaction to an increasing "conflict-producing potential" caused by processes of social 
differentiation in the context of the evolution of a market economy and "modernization" of 
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economy and society (cf. Drucker-Brown, 1993; Geschiere/Fisiy 1994; Jong 1987a; Kohnert 
1983; McLeod 1975). 
 The gradual change from subsistence production to market economy even in rural areas of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, resulted in the spread of social relationships, typical for the stage of 
development of a commodity economy, even in the realm of organization and methods of 
witchcraft accusation. In pre-colonial times occult knowledge was organized and passed on 
rather in a collective way, at least in the majority of acephaleous African societies. Generally 
speaking secret societies on the village level were in charge of identification and punishment of 
witches. Since the beginning of colonial rule the persecution of witches has gradually been 
taken out of the hands of the village or ethnic community. It is either becoming individualized, 
being the domain of professional witch-hunters, or appropriated by external (state) agencies, 
regarded with dismay and distrust by their subjects (e.g. in cases of political witch-hunts, see 
below). Case studies from Northern Nigeria (cf. Kohnert 1983) or Zaire (cf. Duvieusart 
1992:468/69) showed that already in the 1950s many witch-doctors started to pursue their art 
professionally, like any other business. Dating back to the time of the famous "oil-boom" of the 
1970ths, there are reports from Nupeland (Northern Nigeria) of witch-doctors, who claim to be 
qualified by (more or less obscure) "diplomas", proudly displayed in their office, together with 
photographs of famous cases of confessed or convicted witches, discovered by them (cf. 
Kohnert 1983). In Zaire these new entrepreneurs were even in possession of "official" 
credentials issued by the provincial administration. Thus, "witch-doctor" is becoming a 
profession, similar to that of a trader, lawyer, physician, or a village chemist. Requests for his 
(or her) service most often come from concerned individuals. More rewarding, however, are 
calls by family heads or local village chiefs. At times local chiefs - probably "convinced" by 
higher administrative authorities, eventually collaborating with the sorcerers - are obliged to 
"purify" their villages from witches (cf. Duvieusart 1992:468 for Zaire; Kohnert 1983 for 
Northern Nigeria; Drucker-Brown, 1993:539 for Northern Ghana).  
 Usually, witch-doctors are requested to search for persons, who might be held responsible 
for the calamity that struck some close relative, the family, or the village. The persecution and 
punishment of witches is increasingly being commercialized, comparable to indulgence practices 
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(Ablaß-Handel) of the catholic church in 16th century Europe (cf. the debate on the European 
witch-hunts, Ben-Yehuda 1980; Hoak 1983; cf. Elwert's "venality-thesis"; Elwert-Kretschmer, 
1995). 
 Witchcraft belief in Africa is expressed in different forms, according to region, religion, or 
ethnic affiliation. There are, however, also some essential common grounds. Thus, witchcraft 
belief as such is in general not gender-specific (contrary to the practice of its persecution). 
Moreover, all over Africa the belief in occult forces is very common at different individual 
levels of education and various religious confessions. Since the jihad of the pre-colonial (19th 
century) Shonghai empire, for example, Moslem rulers of the Nigerian emirates, have skillfully 
employed witchcraft beliefs for their own vested interests (cf. Kohnert, 1983). The same is true 
for Christian traditional leaders in Yorubaland (cf. Awolalu 1979:81-84). By the end of colonial 
rule, fundamentalist Christian churches and sects, came to the fore which, eager to respond to a 
popular demand, integrated into their conception of the universe the very same traditional 
elements condemned by European missionaries as "pagan" (e.g. Chrétiennes Célestes, 
Pentecostal-Church, Rosarian, and various independent African churches like the Kimbanguists 
of Zaire). Most of them claim to provide most effective protection against witchcraft to its 
followers. For this very reason these fundamentalist Christian churches enjoy today a 
considerable attraction (cf. Meyer, B. 1992, about the combat of Pentecostal groups against 
adzetwo (witches) in south-east Ghana). High representatives of established Christian churches, 
such as the bishops of Lagos and Kinshasa, believe in witchcraft too. According to the latter, 
this belief is shared by about 80% of all Africans. Last not least, even African scholars and 
decision-makers in economy and society, educated in a renowned Western universities, strongly 
share witchcraft beliefs - according to occasion, more or less openly (cf. Kohnert 1983; Kadya 
Tall 1995). 
 
2. WITCHCRAFT-ACCUSATIONS, TARGET GROUPS, AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Depending on the mode of production and living conditions in which witchcraft accusations are 
rooted, they may have either repressive or emancipatory effects. More often than not the 
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gradual change over time, of both content and meaning of witchcraft-accusations, happens to 
appear unnoticed by the population, because it is disguised by continuity in the outward 
appearance of the cult. Even though the formal framework of specific anti-witchcraft cults (e.g. 
masks, rituals, and structure of secret societies) like the ndakó gboyá of the Nupe remain 
unchanged, under surface its witchcraft accusations may pursue totally different ends over time 
(cf. Kohnert 1983). This difference in content can be explained only in the light of the cultural 
and social setting in which the population concerned is embedded and which stimulates the faith 
in occult forces. Any analysis and prognosis regarding the influence of these belief-systems on 
economic and cultural change in Africa would have to pay due consideration to the articulation 
of witchcraft accusations, its socio-cultural dimension, and modes of production from which it 
originates. Unfortunately, however, this insight begins to pave its way only gradually. It has 
been applied up to now just in some isolated field-studies (cf. e.g. Fisiy/Geschiere 1990; 
Geschiere/Fisiy 1994; Hunter-Wilson 1951; Kohnert 1983; Offiong 1983). There still exists a 
lot of confusion about the apparently contradicting different political functions of witchcraft 
accusations and their underlying reasons (cf. controversy between Geschiere 1995 and 
Buijtenhuijs 1995); much of these contradictions could be solved by referring to the articulation 
between witchcraft accusations and modes of production as indicated above. 
 
In most cases the effects of witchcraft belief work to the disadvantage of the poor and deprived. 
It serves predominantly as an ideology that legitimates oppression and exploitation. Up to early 
colonial rule, anti-witchcraft movements, like the ndakó gboyá in the hands of the Etsu Nupe 
(emir of Nupeland, Northern Nigeria), served to exploit their subjects ruthlessly; in the 1920's 
the annual raids of the ndakó gboyá in the Bida-Emirate grew to such dimension that the British 
colonial administration feared, there might be nothing left to pay its taxes. Thus, the movement 
was prohibited (cf. Nadel, 1954). Whether this prohibition has ever been really effective, is 
open to question. Anyway, the ndakó gboyá reappeared in revised form by the time of 
independence (cf. Kohnert 1983). Apart from this there are many examples of despots of 
modern independent Africa, like Mobutu of Zaire or Eyadéma of Togo, who continue to use 
magic and witchcraft beliefs for the domination and exploitation of their citizens (cf. Ellis, S. 
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1993:471/72; Toulabor M. 1986:124-131 for Togo, and Buijtenhuijs 1995:134-35; Schatzberg, 
1993:448/49 for Africa in general). 
 In addition, the use of witchcraft and magic in intra-elite competition for economic or 
political power is quite common. For example, all over Africa the use of experts in occult forces 
as high ranking councilors of African heads of state - independent of the latters political 
orientation - are well known. The senegalesian marabout Kébé at the "court" of Mobutu (cf. 
Nguza, 1982:63), or M. Cissé, the malian marabou and minister of Kérékou, the "communist" 
head of state of the former Peoples Republic of Benin, are just two famous examples. Nguza 
(1982:29/30), a former minister of foreign affairs of Mobutu, provides other illustrative 
examples of the use of "black magic" by the wives of the barons du règime in the fight against 
political opponents. 
 
Although women and men alike do take an active part in witchcraft accusations, women most 
often participate in a rather inferior way. In many secret cults for example, they are excluded as 
office-holders, and in addition they are more likely to suffer from accusations to employ 
witchcraft than men. It is not witchcraft belief in general, but rather its persecution which often 
has strong gender-specific, i.e. women discriminating features. Different - sometimes 
contradicting - reasons have been offered, to explain this apparent gender-bias (cf. Brain 
1982:374 for Tanzania; Drucker-Brown, 1993:540, 542-548 for the Manprusi of Northern 
Ghana; Nadel, S.F. 1952 for four African societies). The concept of "sex-antagonism" 
developed by S.F. Nadel (ibid.) figures prominently among these explanations which have been 
reconsidered elsewhere (cf. Kohnert 1983:8-11, 25-27, 29-35). Here it might suffice to say that 
most of the "pure" one-dimensional theories of witchcraft, be it cognitive, political, or feminist, 
are likely to be too restrictive in reflecting the reality, although each of them may contain valid 
arguments. 
 
In particular circumstances witchcraft belief can also be a means of the poor in the struggle 
against oppression. An example, often mentioned in this respect, are witchcraft accusations 
against the nouveaux riches, who do not obey African traditional customary laws of the village 
- 7 - 
community, like the rules of redistribution and solidarity with kinsmen, of sharing wealth and 
assisting the poorer members of the community. Sanctioning offenders of these rules by means 
of occult forces is said to be an effective barrier to individual accumulation of wealth, capital 
formation, and economic development, especially in African societies without strong central 
authorities, as among the Maka of Cameroon or the Ibibio of Eastern Nigeria (cf. Geschiere 
1995:144, 230; Fisiy/Geschiere 1991:252/53, 269; Offiong 1983:81). But even in the highly 
stratified Northern Nigerian societies, like Bornu Emirate, witchcraft accusations, related to 
enrichment through development projects, do occur (Tijani 1976:130; cf. Geschiere 1995:10, 
255, for other examples of witchcraft accusations related to development projects). 
 The rationale behind this kind of reasoning of the unusually successful, the évolués, is 
different according to individual circumstances: either they are afraid of being killed by envious 
local witches, or they fear being accused and harassed as witches themselves, because the 
villagers hold they could have acquired their wealth only by occult powers at the expense of 
their fellows. But the result seems to be always the same: negative incentives for the 
development of individual achievement motivation and capital formation. The other side of this 
coin is the fear of the better-off and go-getters concerning "exploitation" by their family or 
kinship group. Therefore many newly rich African migrate and hesitate to return to their 
families or home villages. A case study from the Giriama of Kenya even reports of rich traders 
who preferred to convert from their traditional animist religion to Islam, because they saw no 
other way to evade customary rules of greeting, which might involve poisoning in case the 
traders are accused of witchcraft (Parkin 1979:223). 
 In summing up, there seems to exist surprising parallels concerning the function of African 
witchcraft beliefs, based on communal modes of production with similar beliefs in other parts 
of the world. Concerning Tudor England of the 17th century for example, witchcraft 
prosecution has been described as a means of effecting decisive social change from the 
egalitarian mutually dependent village community to a more individualistic and stratified social 
structure; the old values of mutual aid were in fact undermined, while on the surface, they were 
maintained by witchcraft-accusations (cf. Macfarlane, 1970:302-03), an explanation which 
seems to fit quite well into the present conditions in Africa (as summarized above). 
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Still another form of social conflict resolution are messianic grass-root movements "from 
below" which use magic and witchcraft accusations as a means to fight the "evil" in this world 
by establishing "cults of counter-violence" (cf. Wilson 1992; Buijtenhuijs 1995:136-37). Such 
cults are more often than not dependent on charismatic leaders, as shown in the battle of the 
Naprama under Manuel António against the terrorism of the "devils" of the RENAMO in 
Northern Mozambique in 1990/91 (cf. Wilson, K.B. 1992:582). The RENAMO too, tried 
effectively to legitimize its violence by rituals performed in collaboration with their feticeiros. 
The fight of the Holy-Spirit-movement of the Acholi against the government army in Uganda in 
1987 (cf. Behrend, H. 1992), and the contested use of witchcraft accusations against their 
enemy by militants of the guerrilla army of Amilcar Cabral in the early stages of the Guinean 
liberation war, are similar examples. The latter may have had in mind to follow the example of 
the Fulbe of Portuguese-Guinea, who revolted against their colonial emperors in the beginning 
of this century. Their revolt, again, was to a large extent initiated and lead by the jambacos 
(fetish priests) who applied its magic with considerable success (cf. Nogueira 1947:716). Thus 
witchcraft movements directed against colonial domination were quite common in other parts of 
Africa too. An interesting case to study are the Ijov-, Haakaa-, and Inyambuan movements of 
the Tiv in Northern Nigeria analyzed by Tseayo (1975:57-74). Also witch-hunting of war-
mongers, and (alleged) brains behind disasters like epidemics, starvation etc. occurs fairly often, 
e.g. in Burundi 1993 (cf. Afrique Express, 12.10.93).  
 
Finally, even frustrated efforts of social groups which took an active part in liberation 
movements did result in systematic witchcraft accusations "from below". The njang-njang-
movement in Guinea-Bissau in the 1980's may serve as convenient example in this respect. The 
hopes of some Balante women, who during their active participation in the liberation struggle of 
Guinea-Bissau succeeded in shaking off the yoke of paternalistic domination, are supposed to 
be the driving force behind this movement. After independence had been achieved and the 
PAIGC took control, some women grew disappointed when they realized that mainly their male 
counterparts harvested the fruits of their common victory. The grudges of the njang-njang 
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women against the alleged dominance of the homens grande took the form of witchcraft 
accusations. Later-on such accusations launched by village-youth (male and female) in general 
against those who had betrayed the ideals of the liberation war (and also their ideals based on a 
somewhat fundamentalist Christian ethic) posed a real threat to Government which tried to 
legitimate its rule with similar egalitarian socialist ideals. The njang-njang became forbidden, 
many of its followers imprisoned, and some of the able-bodied men were coerced into forced 
labor in state development projects, where they had to assist the villagers in the reconstruction 
of dikes in rice polders (cf. Kohnert, 1988; Cardoso 1990; Jong 1987).  
 In the beginning even some progressive missionaries of the region saw these witchcraft-
accusations as a dynamic element in the process of development rather than a barrier (personal 
communication, Padre Lino, Bissau, June 22, 1986). In the cases mentioned above, however, 
witchcraft beliefs have just limited "emancipatory" effects - if any at all - and even those are 
outweighed by negative side-effects. Therefore we strongly advice against any form of 
utilization of witchcraft beliefs in promoting development. 
 As soon as the charismatic leaders of these grass-root movements die, the hopes for a life 
free from conflict and violence that once motivated the movement, are usually disappointed. In 
fact, it is difficult to transmit occult power, particularly if it is linked with specific personal 
charisma, which has not yet been replaced by recognition of institutionalized spiritual powers of 
a secret cult. Successors of charismatic leaders often become victims of the temptation that lies 
in the possession and execution of power which then is mainly used for their own selfish 
purpose.  
 All these examples demonstrate the crucial importance of occult power in the social control 
of violence in Africa. Modern and traditional rulers alike have to understand and speak the 
language of ritual violence if they want to guarantee anything near to a state-monopoly of 
violence which has been considered as a necessary, but not sufficient, pre-condition of 
advanced stages of civilization (cf. Elias, 1976:444-447; Ellis, 1995). 
 
3. INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE BELIEF IN OCCULT FORCES 
AND ITS MEANING FOR DEMOCRATISATION 
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Since the end of colonial rule magic and witchcraft beliefs have been instrumentalized in 
various ways for political purposes. Thus, occult forces become a weapon in the battle for 
supremacy over rival politicians. Even newly democratized states like Benin are no exception 
from this rule. For reasons of convenience we suggest a categorization of this 
instrumentalization in three different types: 
First, legitimization of political power by means of occult beliefs. Thus politicians document 
their power also in the spiritual realm by attributing personal magic powers to themselves. This 
is a common practice which can be found in the bulwarks of "traditionalism", like the Northern 
Nigerian emirates, as well as in young African democracies. The case of the present head of 
State of Benin, Nicéphore Soglo may serve as a useful example. Educated at western 
universities and employed by the World Bank as one of its directors in Paris, he contested the 
place of Kérékou as president of the Benin Republic in 1991. At the end of the campaign for 
the presidential elections Soglo fell seriously ill. He had to be flown out for treatment at the 
military hospital of Val-de-Grace in Paris. For every Benin citizen it was clear beyond doubt 
that Soglo had been "bewitched" by his adversary Kérékou. Later on Soglo was at pains to 
invoke the backing of renowned vodounon to demonstrate his superior power even in the realm 
of occult forces. With the organization of an international vodoun-festival "Ouidah 92" he 
became known among the population as a leading figure in the combat against witchcraft (cf. 
Kadya Tall 1995:199-207; Mayrargue 1995). In January 1996 vodoun became finally 
recognized officially by the Head of State as one of the great religions of Benin, beside Islam 
and Christianism. Many voters believed that the timing of this recognition had been chosen in a 
bid to enhance Soglos chances of reelection in the presidential elections two months later. 
Typical of this and similar cases is that rulers use witchcraft beliefs in a defensive manner, both 
as deterrent vis à vis their adversaries and to impress or assure their followers. 
 On the other hand there are autocratic rulers who use magic and witchcraft beliefs in a rather 
offensive ways, either by attacking rivals directly by means of "black magic" (e.g. poisoning, 
psycho-terror) or in using psychological warfare, by threatening potential voters and political 
opponents under the pretext of being able to see who is voting for them, and the subsequent 
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threat of reacting accordingly. Examples of this aggressive form of instrumentalization of 
witchcraft belief abound all over Africa. They range from more or less veiled threats up to the 
assassination of political adversaries (for examples cf. Schatzberg, 1993:448-450; Toulabor 
1986:124-131; Ellis, 1993:471/72). During the Togolese National Conference of August 1991, 
for example, the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) exposed a number of cases 
of political opponents of the Eyadéma-Regime which were imprisoned, tortured, and executed 
because of alleged "witchcraft" against the Head of State. In some cases mere accusation of 
opponents by district officers was regarded as sufficient proof that they were witches which had 
to be imprisoned secretly in the concentration camp of Mantouri or elsewhere (cf. Kaboré, 
1991:25; Africa Confidential, 13/09/91:3). 
 Finally, opposition against the belief in witchcraft may be used as a cover or convenient 
means to discredit other political opinions or opponents and the socio-cultural setting in which 
they are embedded. Advocates of modernization theories for example, use to discard African 
belief- and value-systems which incorporate the belief in magic and witchcraft summarily as 
"traditionally minded"; they want it to be eradicated and replaced as soon as possible by 
Western standards of democratization. The usual argument being that African belief systems are 
based on irrational attitudes (cf. chap. 4) or "false consciousness". Left and right wing 
doctrinism is especially liable to favor this kind of simplistic reasoning. The struggle of the 
Marxist regime of M. Kérékou against traditional rulers and "relics of feudalism" in Benin 
(from Dec. 1975 onwards) may serve as an example (cf. Kadya Tall, 1995:196-99; Elwert-
Kretschmer, 1995; Multhaupt 1990:231-32): Apparently its campaign against "obscurantism, 
witchcraft, and fetishism" was based on the pseudo-Marxist thesis that the belief in occult 
forces is a manifestation of "false consciousness" which ought to be eliminated as soon as 
possible in the interest of the people. Although the way of these political anti-witchcraft 
campaigns was certainly paved with good intentions, its final results were counter-productive. 
For example, local party leaders and the population of Southern Benin misunderstood the 
campaign of the communist party against the "relics of feudalism", backed by the state owned 
radio and newspaper "Ehuzu", as an official call to open up the hunt for witches, i.e. political 
and other "enemies" of the socialist state, namely traditional chiefs and vodoun-priests. The 
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mass of the population regarded witch-hunting in politics, press and radio rather as a 
confrontation of old and new masters, i.e. a competition about political supremacy. Under 
prevailing socio-cultural structures of clientelism and the prebend economy in African states like 
Benin, the one who displays the most effective power (including occult power) is more often 
than not considered to be the legitimate ruler. 
 
Since about two decades, we can observe the revival of the recognition of witchcraft within the 
African judiciary for similar reasons. This recognition had been refused for almost a century 
due to the influence of colonial law, which ruled that a defense founded on the belief in 
witchcraft should be rejected, at least as far as "modern" formal law is concerned (in contrast to 
customary law; for different case studies cf. Fisiy 1990, on Cameroon; Chavunduka 1980, on 
Zimbabwe; Kohnert 1983 on Nigeria). But by now there are African judges who seriously 
consider even the training of judges in matters of supernatural powers in order to assure a more 
effective legal prosecution of witches. Thus a judge at the court of appeal at Daloa, Côte 
d'Ivoire, at the occasion of his installation (in Nov. 1993), made an appeal for the initiation of 
judges into the art of witchcraft (cf. Fraternité Matin, 16.11.93). Already in the early 1980's a 
staff member of the faculty of law at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, one of the renowned 
Nigerian Universities, called publicly for a change in the attitudes of Nigerian courts towards 
witchcraft too, with a similar reasoning (cf. Chukkol 1981:30-34). 
 
Apparently the belief in occult forces thus lends itself to support any kind of political system, 
whether despotic or democratic. This is not as surprising as it might seem at first sight. In fact 
most supernatural, e.g. religious beliefs have been used at one time or another exactly for the 
same purpose. Just remind the political position of Christian churches from the time of the 
crusades up to the First and Second World War. Similar to any other system of belief, there are 
no scientific methods of falsification of African magic and witchcraft belief. By its very nature it 
evades inter-subjective control on the part of the faithful. 
 However, believers in occult forces everywhere (not just in Africa) are particularly exposed 
to the danger of domination and exploitation by their cult leaders because of the atmosphere of 
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secrecy which surrounds these cults, combined with gender- and age-specific access restrictions 
(secret cults in Africa are often women-discriminating), hierarchical systems of knowledge 
(according to different levels of initiation etc.), and last not least, the threat of severe 
punishment (ultimately the death penalty) in case of treason. I should dare to formulate as 
working hypothesis that the degree of secrecy and its rigidity of enforcement for a given 
religious cult closely correlate with the degree of exploitation of its followers. Of course this 
should not be regarded as an iron rule, and one may argue that any religious cult, and any 
political system supported by it, depends on at least some degree of secrecy. However it is 
obvious to me that this is not just a question of degree, but of qualitative differences: anti-
witchcraft cults for example are detrimental to equality, transparency, and accountability, three 
basic conditions of both the development of democratic attitudes and poverty-alleviating 
development projects. 
 
On the other hand, the promotion of transparency and the democratization of decision-making 
processes, on all levels, in politics as well as in society and economy, would not just favor the 
process of democratization and development in general; it would most likely contribute to the 
gradual eradication of witchcraft beliefs too. Where there is transparency, insight into the 
motives of your neighbor, relative, or political rival, and more equal access to resources, there is 
less need to look for scapegoats which could be blamed for individual misfortune. 
 
In general the commandments of magic-religious belief systems such as the vodoun are meant 
to conserve traditional social and ethnic structures from which they originate. But there are 
exemptions. First, we showed already above that the overall impact of those belief systems does 
not necessarily correspond with the intended results and aims. The long-term effect of the 
witchcraft accusations based on the communal mode of production for example, might very 
well result in the unintended weakening of communal structures of mutual aid, and the 
individualization and commercialization of social relationships. Second, under certain favorable 
circumstances, enlightened progressive leaders may be able to effect a gradual change in the 
meaning of their cults. They may even try to adapt it to the requirements of democratization 
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and the construction of civil society. For example by mediating basic ethical values (e.g. 
solidarity, integrity, courage, respect towards authorities) which may be favorable to the 
creation of civil society and consolidation of the state (e.g. monopolization of violence) as well, 
if the point of reference will be no longer the clan or the patronage network but the nation. 
 However, the experience of past five years of democratization in Africa tells us that it is 
extremely difficult to effect such a change in the short run, even under favorable conditions, 
like in Benin. In case of conflict between local versus national or international value systems, 
customary rules and the clientelistic network of traditional rulers rather support the status quo 
of existing power relations, with all its negative consequences on nation building and the quality 
of state-government. This is exactly one reason, why it is so difficult to translate the political 
conditionality of the international donor community into public policy. Even western educated, 
well-meaning high-ranking African politicians with excellent international reputation are 
sometimes helpless with regard to the struggle against corruption and nepotism. They might 
dispose over sufficient resources to be independent in material and financial matters, but could 
nevertheless feel at the same time a pressing need for protection against imminent menaces by 
occult powers. By painful personal experience quite a number of African politicians realized 
that in case of conflict nobody could protect them against threats of the super-natural universe 
but their traditional rulers. In this case they would still have to pay allegiance to the spiritual 
overlords of their local setting which are more often than not rather traditionally minded, i.e. 
they would have to serve the interests of patronage and local solidarity first. Recent attempts in 
Benin to upgrade vodoun as officially recognized national religion, have been successful, last 
not least because of the active support of the Head of State himself. This has been interpreted 
by many Benin citizen as the paying of "old debts" on the part of the Soglo family. Whether 
this constitutes at the same time a point of departure for the creation of a new authentic African 
ethic to promote economic and social development of the Nation, similar to the function of the 
Protestant ethic in the course of capitalist development in Europe, remains to be seen. 
 
4. ON THE MEANING OF OCCULT BELIEF FOR PLANNING AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
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Development projects - especially poverty-alleviating ones - usually intervene into existing social 
structures of a target population, overloaded with conflicts between different strata, ethnic or 
religious groups, young and old, male and female. As a rule, the benefit of the project is not 
distributed equally between these conflicting groups. Therefore it is likely to add further social 
stress which endangers the already precarious balance of power. By now it has been recognized 
that even the most sophisticated planning methods can not prevent vested interests and hidden 
agendas of all parties involved to exercise a decisive but incalculable influence on the 
implementation of development projects. From this point of view projects create new arenas for 
strategic groups in their struggle for power and control over project resources (cf. Bierschenk et 
al 1993:97-106). In view of what has been said above about the close relationship between 
social stress, witchcraft accusations, and development it is only reasonable to expect that the 
belief in occult forces exerts a strong influence on the implementation of development project in 
Africa too. Examples of interference of witchcraft belief with project planning and execution in 
Africa abound for those who want to see (2). But unfortunately most Western development 
experts, the majority of which is still rather interested in technology transfer than in improved 
human relations, do not want to recognize this problem, at least not officially, and not as 
problem which should be tackled professionally. At informal occasions, at the hotel bar for 
example, many of them readily admit to know of such strange incidences. But as they consider 
it as the mere outcrop of irrational (i.e. "primitive") behavior, they see no point in solving these 
problems professionally, that is by the means of proven scientific methods. They might think 
that the process of modernization, investment in human capital and education, as well as 
exposure to the "advanced" European culture embedded in development aid, would 
automatically eliminate this kind of problems. This, however, is a fallacy as shown above. 
Eradication of magic- and witchcraft belief is not a question of intelligence or education, but of 
modes of production, social relations, and the openness of society. 
 
African systems of occult belief are anything else but "irrational" as has been demonstrated 
already by a classic of ethnographic literature (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937). Although its inherent 
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logic can hardly be grasped in thought patterns of natural science, yet its methodological 
structure is no less rational than the impulse-giving ethics of the Protestant spirit of capitalism in 
19th century Europe or Confucianism in the case of newly industrialized Asian countries. The 
relevant distinction in this respect is that each adheres to a different rationality with different 
degrees of achievement- and development orientation.  
 Even though we might not want to accept this kind of occult rationality, we are in a position 
to comprehend it. We are able to analyze its internal logical fabric as well as its impact on 
economy, society, and politics in Africa in general, and on target groups, project policy and 
implementation in particular. 
 
Due to long experience of blind missionary zeal or arrogant attitudes of Colonialists and 
educated Westerners, Africans (beneficiaries and local experts alike) tend to think that Western 
development experts are principally unable to understand the peculiarities of African magic. 
Due to lack of information and concern, Western attitudes towards this issue have been 
characterized by ignorance and intolerance. For these reasons it is difficult to arrive at an open 
discussion on the topics in question with African counterparts or decision makers. It is quite 
surprising that although there exist innumerable case-studies and a long-dating discussion 
among anthropologists and sociologists on the meaning of witchcraft in the African socio-
cultural context, neither the so-called "applied" social science nor development experts 
recognize how important the consideration of magic- and witchcraft beliefs is relative to their 
actual work. Social research regarding the phenomenon of occult beliefs with a implementation-
oriented approach is still in its initial stage, and so far was practically limited to the area of 
psychiatry and social psychology (cf. Jong 1987a). It would be especially desirable to strengthen 
the systematic analysis of the impact of these beliefs on the socio-structural and socio-cultural 
changes in Africa in general (for first examples cf. Aguessy 1993; Brain 1982), and on the 
process of democratization and development  co-operation in particular (cf. Kadya Tall 1995; 
Mayrargue 1995). In the domain of conflict research, witchcraft accusations could serve as 
social strains gauge (cf. Marwick 1964) and indicators of deep yet latent conflicts.  
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 Although we are at pains to demonstrate that the belief in occult powers is already a serious 
constraint on ordinary development co-operation, it is even more relevant in the context of the 
political dialogue and democratization projects which are presently favored by the international 
donor community in Africa. The quest for "good government", accountability and transparency, 
human rights projects, and the constant underlining of poverty-alleviation puts an increasing 
stress on the political and social elite of recipient states of development assistance. In this social 
climate witchcraft-accusations flourish because of the search for scapegoats to explain 
individual misfortune; and this poses additional threats to the requested openness of dialogue. 
All this needs to be taken into account if we really want to promote participatory planning and 
implementation of projects under adverse socio-cultural conditions, on whatever level: Whether 
during bilateral government negotiations, or during the cozy atmosphere of project planning 
workshops, guided by the philosophy of the logical framework approach, or in the course of 
"exposure programs" with the target groups, we have to stress over and over again that 
development is a question of improving human relations, self-help capacities, i.e. of social, and 
not so much of technical assistance. 
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Notes: 
(1) The author acknowledges valuable comments on earlier drafts by Peter Geschiere, Karola Elwert-
Kretschmer, Leonard Harding, Andreas Mehler, Michael S.O. Olisa, Lazare Séhouéto, as well as 
constructive critizism by two anonymous referees (magiewd.txt; 29.02.96). 
 
(2) cf. Tijani, 1976:130; Geschiere, 1995:10, 255 for examples of witchcraft related social conflicts in 
development projects. - However, in general the documentation of such cases proves to be quite 
difficult. Not just because of neglect of such cases by conventional development experts, but also, 
because this constitutes a highly sensitive subject. Let me illustrate the complexity of the 
documentation-problem by just one example: In 1995 I participated in an impact study of church 
development projects in Zimbabwe. Although I was told by one country expert before my departure 
that - unlike Western Africa - occult belief systems did not constitute a major problem in Zimbabwe, I 
came to realize that out of five rural development projects three of them, at one stage or another, run 
into serious problems because of witchcraft accusations. In one irrigation project implementation had 
been delayed for several years because of "land tenure conflicts" as the project officer told me. Later 
on I realized that it was rather the traditional chief of a neighboring village who was opposed to the 
construction of the irrigation dam at the planned site, because he wanted to have the project in his 
home village. Quite understandably he did not forward his real interest, but warned the neighboring 
villagers that if they would proceed with their project, they would run into serious problems because 
the land of the construction site had to be regarded as sacred land of their ancestors. After some years 
the dispute was solved with the help of a local priest and the dam was constructed at the original site. 
However, short afterwards the priest died suddenly; actually he committed suicide (out of reasons 
which do not interest here), but the villagers thought he got bewitched and killed; this incidence again 
put at risk the whole project. 
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